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This paper examines a dynamic general equilibrium model with supply friction.
With or without friction, the competitive equilibrium is efﬁcient. Without fric-
tion, the market price is completely determined by the marginal production cost.
If friction is present, no matter how small, then the market price ﬂuctuates be-
tween zero and the “choke-up” price, without any tendency to converge to the
marginal production cost, exhibiting considerable volatility. The distribution of
the gains from trading in an efﬁcient allocation may be skewed in favor of the
supplier, although every player in the market is a price taker.
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1. Introduction
The production of any commodity is subject to a number of constraints that are collec-
tively known as friction. Examples abound. In a large organization such as a hospital
or a call center, a large workforce must be maintained to ensure effective delivery of
services. New employees are required to increase capacity of service, but proper talent
must be identiﬁed and trained to be placed in position, which takes time. In supplying
a seasonal fashion product, the retailer maintains a small inventory that is available at
short notice, while maintaining a contract with the supplier for deliverables in case of
an unexpected surge in demand. It is more economical to have such a contract than to
maintain inventory, but it takes some time to deliver the product from the supplier to
the retailer if demand increases unexpectedly (Dasgupta et al. 2005).
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If there is an unexpected increase in demand, then it will take some time for supply
to catch up with demand. However, one might still expect the market price to hover
near the marginal production cost as long as the supply side friction is not severe. This
reasoning leads to the conclusion that extreme price volatility, or a persistent deviation
of the market price away from the marginal cost, is evidence of market failure or the
presence of noncompetitive behavior. In this paper we ask whether these conclusions
are truly justiﬁed.
This research project was motivated in part by events in the California wholesale
electricity market between 1998 and 2000, which apparently did not function as envi-
sioned by policy makers. As early as 1998, the ancillary service market repeatedly expe-
rienced dramatic price spikes, followed by extended periods of near zero prices, which
is considered as early evidence of market dysfunction (Wolak et al. 1998, Fels and Lindh
2001,an dNavarroandShames2003). Thispromptedaseriesofattemptstoimprovethe




current electricity markets: Demand exhibits virtually no price responsiveness and supply
facesstrictproductionconstraintsandverycostlystorage. Suchastructurewillnecessarily
lead to periods of surplus and of shortage, the latter resulting from both real scarcity of
electricityandfromsellersexercisingmarketpower. Extremevolatilityinpricesandproﬁts
will be the outcome.
The main objective of this paper is to address two fundamental questions. Suppose
that observed market prices show repeatedupward spikes followed by extendedperiods
in which prices are essentially zero, showing no tendency to converge to the marginal
production cost. Suppose in addition that the data show that suppliers extract surplus
exceeding what they would obtain if the market price matched the marginal production
cost.
First is a positive question. Can a perfectly competitive market with a small amount
of friction generate such an outcome? Based on these observations, can we conclude
that the market is dysfunctional and some suppliers are exercising market power? Sec-
ond is a normative question. Are wild ﬂuctuations of market prices harmful for social
welfare? Can the market achieve an efﬁcient allocation?
We formulate our questions in terms of a dynamic general equilibrium model in
which market demand evolves in continuous time and a consumer realizes a surplus
only if the service is delivered. If the service cannot be delivered despite the standing
order, theconsumersuffers“inconvenience,” whichisquantiﬁedasnegativeutility. The
supplier can provide the service instantaneously up to its capacity at zeromarginal cost.
The supplier must pay for the cost of capacity. We assume that all agents are price tak-
ers, rigorously eliminating any room for market manipulation. The market is subject to
supply side friction: Capacity cannot be increased instantaneously, although capacity
can be shut down instantaneously without incurring any extra cost (free disposal).
Werigorouslyanalyzethecompetitiveequilibriumandexploreitsproperties. Under
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a closed form solution for the equilibrium price functional, which clearly reveals how
small supply friction combined with small volatility in demand can result in wild price
ﬂuctuations.
Based on these results, we conclude that the marginal production cost is no longer a
determiningfactorforthemarketclearingprice. Moreover,ﬂuctuationsofmarketprices
are implied rather than refuted by an efﬁcient market.
Depending upon the initial condition of the economy, it is possible that the sup-
plier extracts a seemingly excessive portion of the gains from trading, while the market
remains efﬁcient and free from strategic behavior.
In some markets where demand is unpredictable and the consumer must bear the
cost of inconvenience, it is a common practice for the consumer to purchase an ex-
tra amount of the good over the instantaneous demand as a precautionary measure.
This is known as the reserve. If the consumer cannot purchase extra units for future use
since the good is not storable, then the consumer makes a contract with the supplier to
maintain extra capacity so that the supplier can offer service immediately in response
to a sudden increase in demand. While this extra capacity serves as the reserve in the
conventional sense, it is the supplier rather than the consumer who keeps the excess
capacity and who is paid for the extra capacity by the consumer.
Theorem1containsacompletecharacterizationofthecompetitiveequilibriumout-
come, while Theorem 2 describes its welfare properties. The closed form solution for
the equilibrium price functional is represented as a function of simple equilibrium state
variables, rather than the entire history of outcomes. If the costs are linear, then the
equilibrium price at time t can be expressed as a function of the equilibrium reserve
Re(t) and demand D(t) via Pe(t) = pe(Re(t) D(t)).T h eequilibrium price functional is
a piecewise constant function of the equilibrium reserve process,
pe(re d)= (v +cbo)I{re < 0}  (1)
where cbo is the marginal cost of inconvenience imposed upon the consumer in case
demand is not met and v is the reservation value of the consumer. The sum cbo +v is, in
fact, the maximum price the consumer is willing to pay, often called the choke-up price.
A sample path of the three dimensional process (Pe(t) Re(t) D(t)) is illustrated in
Figure 1 for a discrete-time model in which D is a random walk on R.1
The equilibrium price functional has three most surprising features. First, the real-
izedpricesﬂuctuatebetweenthechoke-uppriceandzero,withnotendencytoconverge
to the marginal production cost, regardless of the size of the friction. If the market does
not have sufﬁcient reserve (re < 0), then the market price hits the choke-up price. Alter-
natively, the market price falls to zero if there is excess capacity (re > 0). Wild swings of
prices arise even if the market is free from any strategic manipulation.
Second, the equilibrium allocation is efﬁcient. The deviation of the market price
from the marginal production cost is often suggested as evidence of market dysfunction
1It can be shown that the optimal reserve process is obtained using a hedging-point policy in this case
(Meyn 2007). The hedging-point value r∗ used in this simulation was obtained using the diffusion heuristic
of Meyn (2007), which coincides with the value given in Proposition 1 that follows.218 Cho and Meyn Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
Figure 1. Price dynamics with Brownian demand.
(Fels and Lindh 2001). This observation is accurate in a market without any supply side
friction. But in the presence of supply side friction, the supplier has a reason to increase
the reserve, even if the spot market price for the reserve is zero, because a large reserve
can meet a large demand in the future.
Third,themarginalproductioncostisirrelevant indetermining(1)(oritsgeneraliza-
tion given in Theorem 1), however large the ramping rate constraint might be, because
only two extreme prices will be realized along the sample paths: zero and the choke-up
price. However, the link between the market price and the marginal production cost
is not completely lost. If the demand evolves according to a Brownian motion, we can
characterize the distribution of reserve in an efﬁcient allocation and compute the ex-
pected price, which depends on the initial condition of the economy. For sufﬁciently
large initial reserves, the expected discounted average price coincides with the marginal
production cost. The expected price increases with decreasing initial reserves (approxi-
matingthechoke-uppriceinthelimitasnormalizedinitialreservesapproach−∞). The
potentially higher prices mean that a ﬁrm can generate a positive proﬁt for an extended
period, if not indeﬁnitely.
The dramatic swings of market prices are a consequence of the lack of tradable ca-
pacity that can adjust its level of service instantaneously in response to ﬂuctuations in
demand. Unless we have a market in which the fast service can fetch a high price, no
ﬁrm would be willing to provide such a service. Thus, it is not unreasonable to pre-
sume that the competitive outcome without a market for the ramping rate should be
inefﬁcient.
Ouranalysisshowsotherwise. Thespotmarketfortheserviceperfectlyemulatesthe
market for the ramping rate, thus compensating for the absence of the latter to achieve
an efﬁcient allocation. A fast ramping rate is valuable only if the society is short on
reserve (i.e., Re(t) < 0). Because the service is not storable, the price the consumer is
willing to pay on the spot is v +cbo, which is exactly the same price obtained from (1).
This paperexamines amarket inwhich thenumberofactive ﬁrms isﬁxed. However,
thekeyinsightsextendtoamarketwithoutentrybarriers,withsomenotabledifferences
from the long-run static competitive equilibrium. One can differentiate an inside ﬁrm
from an outside ﬁrm, depending upon the location of its production capacity. One can
model entry as a service provided by a ﬁrm outside of the market for the consumersTheoretical Economics 5 (2010) Efﬁciency and marginal cost pricing 219
Figure 2. Examples of prices in the electric power industry.
inside of the market. Similarly, exit can be formulated as a reduction of service provided
by the outside ﬁrms. The new service provided by the outside ﬁrm helps the market
respond to the demand more rapidly, which leads to a lower discounted average market
price. If the outside ﬁrms can enter and exit instantaneously without any friction, the
market price will then coincide with marginal production cost.
The prices obtained from the equilibrium price functional (1) replicate the impor-
tantqualitativefeaturesofthepricedynamicsshowninFigure2forfourdifferentwhole-
sale electricity markets in Europe and North America. Note that the prices of power in
Ontario and Europe are recent, and the severe volatility shown in the European market
istypicalbehavior thathaspersistedforseveralyears. However,wedonot assertthatthe
recent episodes in California were not caused by strategic behaviorof the participants—
there is ample evidence of noncompetitive behavior. Rather, the main result of this pa-
per should serve as a reminder that the insights built around a static analysis can be
fragile. The welfare evaluation of dynamic markets with friction requires new analytic
tools and a fresh perspective.
In contrast to most existing results based on a static analysis (e.g., Wolfram 1998 and
Hortacsu and Puller 2004), Mansur (2008) examines the dynamic decision problem of
the generator subject to upward and downward ramping constraints to show that the
resulting optimal policy of the price-taking generator may deviate from marginal cost
pricing. OurmodeldiffersfromMansur (2008)asweobtainthedeviationfrommarginal
cost pricing as a consequence of the upward ramping rate constraint alone. Scoring and220 Cho and Meyn Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
settlement rules are proposed in Chao and Wilson (2002) to implement an efﬁcient allo-
cation in the ancillary service market. Our model suggests that even without an elabo-
rate auction mechanism, the competitive marketcan internalize the supply side friction
to achieve an efﬁcient allocation in a dynamic sense.
Throughoutthispaper,bycapacity,wemeanonlinecapacitythatcanrespondtothe
demand instantaneously. This is distinct from the physical production capacity that de-
termines the maximum supply of service. The physical production capacity is implicitly
assumed to be so large that the change of the online capacity is not constrained, so as to
ensure that the ramping constraint is the only friction in the economy.
Constraints on the physical production capacity fundamentally affect the mar-
ket outcome. The nature of this dependency is the topic of the recent paper by
Garcia and Stachetti (2008), which considers the investment decision of duopoly ﬁrms
facing stochastically increasing demand. Short-run friction such as ramping con-
straint are assumed away, and instead the authors examine long-run production expan-
sion/contraction. Instead of the competitive market, Garcia and Stachetti (2008)e x -
plores a dynamic game built upon the duopoly market of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983),
in which the ﬁrms compete in price in each period subject to the physical production
capacity, followed by the investment decision to change the production capacity in the
next round. The Bertrand competition between ﬁrms producing homogeneous goods
does not sufﬁciently reward a ﬁrm with a large market share, and fails to provide incen-
tive for ﬁrms to invest efﬁciently to meet the increasing demand. In the end, the market
does not have sufﬁcient reserve capacity and often generates high equilibrium prices.2
The management of reserves is very similar to inventory management in manufac-
turing applications. While thebulk of research has concentrated on joint pricing and in-
ventory control in a single-period model,3 dynamic versions of this problem are treated
in recent work (Paschalidis and Tsitsiklis 2000, Kleywegt 2001, Monahan et al. 2004,a n d
Bertsimas and de Boer 2005). In some special cases it is found that price is roughly in-
dependent of state (Paschalidis and Tsitsiklis 2000), in sharp contrast to what is found in
thispaper. AtwoperiodinventorycontrolproblemisintroducedinVan Mieghem (1999)
toshowthatundercertainconditions,auniquepriceprocessexiststhatcansupportthe
efﬁcient allocation; the present paper investigates an inﬁnite-horizon model.
Several recent papers analyze energy markets by applying dynamic programming
techniques. Sethi et al. (2005) investigate a stochastic model for an electricity market,
while Wu and Chen (2005) examine dynamic competitive equilibria for a model of the
petroleum market. A key conclusion is that the competitive market is efﬁcient and that
prices coincide with marginal cost. However, to obtain these conclusions the authors
explicitly assume that no hard constraints are active. The ﬁnite ramping constraint is
often binding in the model considered here, which is shown to generate discontinuities
in the market outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally describes the
model. Section 3 contains a characterization of the competitive equilibrium outcome
and its welfare properties. The properties of the competitive equilibrium are further
analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2For a stochastic dynamic treatment of the centralized problem, see Bohn et al. (1984).
3SeesurveysinMcGillandvanRyzin(1999),PetruzziandDada(1999),andBertsimasanddeBoer(2005).Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Efﬁciency and marginal cost pricing 221
2. Model
We examine a market consisting of a single consumer and supplier who are price tak-
ers. These two price-taking agents actually represent an aggregate of a continuum of
identical inﬁnitesimally small consumers and suppliers.
2.1 Demand
We let G(t) denote the available capacity, D(t) denote the demand, and
R(t) = G(t)−D(t)
denotethereserveattimet.L e tGbetheprocessoftheavailablecapacity. Weoftenrefer
to the commodity as the service since it is not storable. Once g = G(t) units of capacity
are built, the supplier can deliver up to g units of service freely and instantaneously at
time t.
It is assumed that consumer demand is perfectly inelastic. Throughout the paper,
by demand, we mean a normalized demand obtained by subtracting the forecasted de-
mand from the actual demand in each period. Thus, the (normalized) demand can be
negative, if the actual demand is less than its forecast. It is assumed that actual demand
at t = 0 is known, which is normalized to 0.
For computation it is convenient to consider the Gaussian model
D(t) = N(t)  (2)
where N is a driftless Brownian motion with instantaneous variance σ2 and N(0) = 0.
Throughout this paper, we use a bold-faced letter to represent a stochastic process,
an uppercase letter to denote a random variable, and a lowercase letter for its realized
value. For example, we write D ={ D(t) | t ≥ 0} for the stochastic demand process and let
d ∈ R denote a possible value of D(t) for a given t ≥ 0.
2.2 Supply
Production is subject to friction, in the sense that the production capacity cannot in-
crease instantaneously: There exists ζ ∈ (0 ∞) such that for all t ≥ 0 and all t  >t,
G(t )−G(t)
t  −t
≤ ζ  (3)
Alternatively, we maintain the assumption of free disposal so that no corresponding
lower bound is imposed.4 Finally, we assume that G(t) is progressively measurable with
r e s p e c tt ot h eh i s t o r y{G(0) D(s) | s ≤ t}.
4In the power industry, generators are also subject to downward ramping constraints, which prevents
a generator from dropping the supply instantaneously. The free disposal assumption actually strengthens
the conclusions of this paper: Even if the generator is allowed to drop the supply instantaneously in case of
excess supply, our analysis shows that the generator will not do so. Instead, it will let the market price drop
to zero.222 Cho and Meyn Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
Theproductiontechnologyofthesupplieris subjecttoaproduction cost c(G(t))for
the production capacity G(t) made available at time t ≥ 0. The cost is incurred, regard-
less of the delivery of the goods. We assume that the cost is a linear function of G(t),
of the form cG(t) for some constant c>0. For each unit of the good delivered, the con-
sumerobtains v unitsofutility. Thus, theutilityoftheconsumeris vmin(D(t) G(t)).A l -
ternatively, if the demand is not met (R(t) < 0), the consumer suffers utility loss cboR(t)
for some cbo > 0.
Linearity is imposed on both the production cost of the producer and the inconve-
nience cost of the consumer so as to obtain the closed form solution for the equilibrium
and to highlight the structure of the equilibrium outcome. Many of the key insights of
this paper can be obtained for nonlinear, convex cost functions, but this requires more
cumbersome notation.
2.3 Equilibrium and efﬁciency
The (spot) price at which the service is traded is denoted P(t) at time t.F o r a g i v e n
price process P, the payoffs of the supplier and the consumer in period t are deﬁned,
respectively, as
WS(t) := P(t)G(t)−cG(t)
WD(t) := vmin(D(t) G(t))−cbomax(0 −R(t))−P(t)G(t) 
It is assumed for simplicity that the consumer and the supplier have the same time pref-
erence, represented by discount rate γ>0. The consumer’s and the supplier’s objective
function is the long-run discounted expected proﬁt with discount rate γ, represented










Whenever the meaning is clear from the context, we suppress the initial condition.



















In this case, Pe is called a competitive equilibrium price process,a n dw el e tRe = Ge − D
denote the equilibrium reserve process.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Efﬁciency and marginal cost pricing 223
The supplier and consumer are each subject to the measurability constraint in their
respective optimization problems (5)a n d( 6). The set of feasible strategies for the sup-
plier is subject to the ramping constraint (3), but the consumer’s optimization problem
is not affected by the ramping constraint in (6). The absence of the ramping constraint
in the consumer’s optimization problem is critical for our analysis.
We use efﬁciency as the criterion for evaluating the welfare performance of the mar-










subject to the ramping constraint (3), where
W(t) = WS(t)+WD(t) 
and its solution G∗ is called an efﬁcient allocation.
We assume that the social planner’s problem (7) has a solution, which is indeed the
case if the demand process evolves according to (2). The proof of Proposition 1 is con-
tained in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. Suppose that D evolves according to (2) and that all costs are linear. For
a given discount rate γ>0,l e tθ+ denote the positive solution to the quadratic equation
1
2σ2θ2 −ζθ−γ = 0










Then the social planner’s problem has a solution and the efﬁcient allocation is character-
izedasathresholdpolicy, sothat R∗ isareﬂected Brownianmotionon (−∞ r∗] satisfying
dG∗(t)
dt
= ζ if R∗(t) < r∗ 
Let {Pe Ge} be a competitive equilibrium. If Ge is an efﬁcient allocation, then we say
that the equilibrium is efﬁcient. If every competitive equilibrium is efﬁcient, then we
say that the ﬁrst welfare theorem holds.224 Cho and Meyn Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
2.4 Economy without ramping constraint: Benchmark
Suppose that the supplier can adjust the production capacity instantaneously at each
period (ζ =∞ ). Then, in the competitive equilibrium, the production capacity must be
such that it can provide the demand at each point of time, and the market price must
be precisely the marginal capacity cost (as long as it is less than the choke-up price). In
case of linear cost satisfying c<v+cbo, the following identities hold:
Pe(t) = c and Ge(t) = D(t)  t ≥ 0 
Note that the supplier’s optimal strategy is myopic: Produce the service as long as the
marginal production cost does not exceed the choke-up price.
As a result, the market outcome of the dynamic model is little more than the rep-
etition of the static outcomes. Since the supplier can produce each unit at the same
marginal cost, the market price is equal to c for each t. The competitive equilibrium is
efﬁcient in an economy without friction. In particular, if the cost function is linear, then
the supplier’s surplus is 0 and the market clearing price should show no volatility.5
If ζ<∞ is very large, then the economy is “close” to an economy without any fric-
tion, because the supplier can respond to the excess demand quickly, if not instanta-
neously. An important question is whether the market outcome is close to the outcome
realized when the supply is frictionless. The answer is anything but expected.
3. Analysis














The price process P is given, which determines the welfare function WD(t) =


















We see in Lemma 1 that this upper bound is attained, which implies that the consumer
is myopic. Lemma 1 is the key result used in Theorem 1 to prove that the market price is
completely determined by the demand side of the market.
5For a general smooth convex cost function, the equilibrium price volatility should be the same order of
magnitude as the demand volatility.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Efﬁciency and marginal cost pricing 225
Lemma 1. The solution to the consumer’s problem is myopic: For each t>0 we have




wD(r t)  (11)
Proof. This is a consequence of the assumption that the consumer does not impose
rate constraints in the optimization (9). Hence the upper bound in (10) can be realized
by enforcing (11)f o ra n yt>0. 
The myopic nature of the consumer’s solution implies that the value function is in-
dependent of r.
Lemma 2. The value function for the consumer is independent of r:
K∗
D(r) = K∗
D(0)  r ∈ R 
Proof. For any initial condition r = R(0), an optimal solution maximizes R(0+) over




The value of K∗
D(r) coincides with this maximum, and is hence independent of r. 
We can easily calculate the demand correspondence rD(p(t)) of the consumer,





−∞ if p(t) > cbo +v
(−∞ 0] if p(t) = cbo +v
0 if 0 <p ( t)<c bo +v
[0 ∞) if p(t) = 0.
(12)
Note that if Re(t) is an equilibrium reserve at time t,t h e n(Re(t) Pe(t)) must be
located in the graph of the demand correspondence where Pe(t) is the market clearing





cbo +v if Re(t) < 0
[0 cbo +v] if Re(t) = 0




Theorem 1. Suppose that there is a competitive equilibrium {Pe Ge}. Then the com-
petitive equilibrium price process must satisfy Pe(t) = pe(Re(t) D(t)) for t ≥ 0 given by
(13), where Re is the reserve process in the competitive equilibrium, and the function
pe:R2 → R+ is (1).226 Cho and Meyn Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
Proof. Deﬁne, for each t and r,
˜ wD(r t) = vmin(D(t) r +D(t))−cbomax(0 −r)−P(t)(r +D(t))  (14)
Lemma 1 states that the solution to the consumer’s optimization problem is myopic:
For each t>0,w eh a v eWD(t) = maxr  ˜ wD(r  t).I fa ts o m et i m et, the welfare function is
differentiable, then we can take derivatives to compute the maximizer in a competitive
equilibrium, which gives (1). 
It is helpful to recall the nature of the contract that is being traded in this market. If
the consumer purchases g>0 units of capacity, paying the total sum of peg,t h e nh ei s
entitled to the amount of service up to g>0 for no additional cost. The marginal price
of the service is 0, as long as the demand for service is less than the available capacity
g>0.
To secure g>0 units of supply, the consumer has to pay peg, which becomes a sunk
cost by the time the capacity produces the service. We can regard the price as a two
part tariff that consists of two components: the price for the marginal unit and the price
for the ﬁxed component. In this case, the marginal price is set to zero and the ﬁxed
component is peg.I nt h i ss e n s e ,pe is not the price paid for the marginal service, but the
price of capacity.
The market price hits the choke-up price cbo + v whenever demand exceeds the
available production capacity (Re(t) < 0). Alternatively, the price falls to zero rather
than to the marginal cost whenever Re(t) > 0. Because the production cost has already
been generated, the supplier is willing to provide the service at any positive price, and
the market price drops down to zero. Because the commodity is not storable, the sup-
plier cannot withdraw the service from the market for later sales nor can the consumer
demand more than what he needs today for future consumption, leaving no room for
smoothing the price dynamics.
Next, we prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium and characterize its prop-
erties.
The conventional approach to construct the competitive equilibrium is ﬁrst to cal-
culatethesupplyscheduleandﬁndtheintersectionwiththedemandschedule. Instead,
wetakeadetourbyprovingthenextlemma,whichwilllaterbecombinedwithLemma2
to prove the ﬁrst welfare theorem and establish the existence of a competitive equilib-
rium.
Lemma 3. If (Re Pe) is a competitive equilibrium, then the three value functions satisfy,
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0
e−γt[WD(t)+WS(t)]dt


















A bound in the reverse direction is obtained by applying the assumption that a compet-


















= K∗(r)  
We are ready to prove the ﬁrst welfare theorem.
Theorem 2. Any competitive equilibrium is efﬁcient.
Proof.L e t Re denote the reserve process in the competitive equilibrium and let K(r)
denote the resulting social welfare. To prove the result, we establish that K(r)= K∗(r).




























   
R=RS
= K∗(r)  (16)
where w∗
D(t) is deﬁned in (11). The equality in (15) is implied by the fact that w∗
D(t)
is independent of RS. The inequality of (16) follows from the fact that the consumer’s
optimization problem is myopic, so that (11) holds. By deﬁnition of K∗(r),t h i sb o u n d
implies that K(r)= K∗(r) as claimed. 
It is challenging to calculate a supply schedule because of the ramping constraint
appearing in the producer’s optimization problem. Yet, we can prove that if Re solves
thesocial planner’sproblem(7), then De = Re+D constitutes acompetitiveequilibrium
together with Pe given by (13).
Proposition 2. Let G∗ be the solution of (7). If Pe is given by (13), {Pe G∗} is a competi-
tive equilibrium.
Proof.R e c a l l t h a t WS(t) = P(t)G(t)−c(G(t)) and
W(t) = vmin(D(t) G(t)) +cbomin(R(t) 0)−c(G(t)) 228 Cho and Meyn Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
If P(t) = Pe(t) is given by (13), then the difference of these welfare functions can be
expressed as a function of exogenous variables:
W(t)−WS(t) = (v −P(t))D(t)+(v +cbo)min(0 R(t))−P(t)R(t)
= (v −P(t))D(t) 














while both optimization problems are subject to the same ramping constraint. Thus, G∗
is the supply schedule induced by Pe.
It remains to prove that R∗ = G∗ − D solves the consumer optimization problem.
Note that if Pe(t) = v + cbo, which occurs when R∗(t) ≤ 0,t h e na n yR(t) ≤ 0 maximizes
the consumer utility and, in particular, R∗(t) ≤ 0 does. Similarly, if Pe(t) = 0,w h i c h
occurswhenR∗(t) ≥ 0,anyR(t) ≥ 0maximizestheconsumerutility,includingR∗(t) ≥ 0.
This concludes the proof. 
4. Properties of competitive equilibria
It is remarkable that the marginal production cost is irrelevant in determining (1), how-
ever large the ramping rate constraint ζ>0 might be. The equilibrium price functional
(1) reveals that a competitive equilibrium entails extreme price volatility. The efﬁcient
equilibrium price can ﬂuctuate between zero and the choke-up price as the market
demand ﬂuctuates. Thus, one cannot deduce market failure based on extreme price
volatility or persistent deviation from the marginal production cost.
The high market price signals the shortage of the reserves, which prompts the pro-
ducer to ramp up the supply of service. However, the low price does not necessarily lead
to a reduction in supply. If there exist abundant reserves, say R(t) > r∗,w h e r er∗ is de-
ﬁned by (8), then the market clearing price is zero and the producer will ramp down the
supply quickly. However, if 0 <R ( t)<r∗, the producer instead ramps up the supply, de-
spitethefactthatthemarketpriceiszero. Thelargereserveservestwopurposes. First, a
large reserve can meet a large demand today. Second, with the presence of the ramping
constraint, a large reserve today is useful to meet a potentially large demand tomorrow.
If R(t) < r∗, the beneﬁt from maintaining a large reserve outweighs the cost of providing
the additional reserve, and the producer increases supply.
Let us examine how the equilibrium outcome depends on key factors such as the
ramping constraint. First, note that the threshold r∗ decreases as the ramping rate ζ>0
increases. Hence the value of additional reserve decreases as the producer can respond
more rapidly to a sudden increase in demand.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Efﬁciency and marginal cost pricing 229
Nextweexaminethedistributionofwelfareinthecompetitiveequilibriumbyapply-
ing Theorem 2 and properties of the efﬁcient allocations summarized in Proposition 1.
Forthis,werecalltherepresentationforK(r)givenin(25),basedontheexponentialran-
dom variable T. Using the fact that ¯ r∗ −R(T) has an exponential distribution combined
with the deﬁnition of the parameter θ∗,w eo b t a i n





Again assuming Re(0) ≥ r∗, the average price can be computed as





+0 = c 
Consequently, assuming large initial reserves, the discounted average expected price is
exactly the marginal production cost of the service in a competitive equilibrium, which
is consistent with the conclusion that the outcome is efﬁcient.
Similar arguments show that the expected price is strictly increasing as reserves de-
crease, for any initial r<r∗,s ot h a tE[Pe(T) | Re(0) = r] >cfor such r. The expected
price approaches the maximum value cbo + v as r tends to negative inﬁnity. As a result,
if the economy severely lacks reserve capacity at t = 0, then the long-run discounted av-
erage payoff of the supplier may exceed what he would have obtained in the economy
without friction. By the same token, the fact that the distribution is skewed in favor of
the supplier does not necessarily imply the presence of market power.
A positive proﬁt induces entry, as the ﬁrms outside of the market are willing to pro-
vide service to the market. To highlight how the insights of the present analysis can be
extended, let us consider a particularly simple model of entry and exit. We differentiate
the inside ﬁrms from the outside ﬁrms according to the location of the production ca-
pacity. Entry is the increase of the service provided by the outside ﬁrms, and exit is its
reduction.
Let us assume that all outside ﬁrms and all inside ﬁrms share a common production
technology, and that the outside ﬁrm can enter the market at the rate of κ ≥ 0 at any
instant. The model coincides with the one without entry when κ = 0. At the other ex-
treme, when κ =∞the outside ﬁrm can respond instantly to an increase in demand. In
a certain sense, κ<∞ models another form of friction in the economy: the difﬁculty for
outside ﬁrms to provide service.
With the service provided by outside ﬁrms, the (aggregate) ramping rate is ζ(1 + κ).
Theincrementofζ comesfromtheincumbentﬁrms,whileζκisprovidedbytheoutside
ﬁrms. The economy is essentially the one with a higher ramping rate, thanks to the out-
side ﬁrms. We can invoke exactly the same analysis to show that the competitive equi-
librium with entry is efﬁcient. For the same initial condition on reserve, the discounted
average price in the competitive equilibrium is nonincreasing with increasing κ.
Friction vanishes as κ →∞ , and in the limit the market price coincides with the
marginalproductioncost. However, κ isﬁniteinanytypicalserviceindustrywithalarge
capital investment, so that wild swings in the equilibrium market price can be expected230 Cho and Meyn Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
(betweenzeroand thechoke-upprice in thismodel). Consequently, price volatilitycan-




can replicate the extreme volatility seen in today’s power markets. What is remarkable is
thatextremevolatilityisanintrinsicpartofthecompetitivemarketequilibrium,andthe
degree of volatility has little to do with the welfare properties of the market outcomes.
Because the marginal pricing rule can be recovered in the competitive market in
a weak sense, as described by (17), we can diagnose the presence of noncompetitive
behavior by estimating the expected delivery price of the commodity and the expected
consumer surplus. While (17) offers a testable implication of the model, we must point
out that this is only a mild implication. It is still possible that observed market data can
showextremelylowconsumersurplus,evenifthemarketisefﬁcient. Webelievethatthe
diagnosis of market power should be based on a well calibrated dynamic model and its
equilibriumoutcomes, whichincludesthecollectionoffeasiblepriceprocesses. Afocus
of the dissertation by Ruiz (2008) is the construction of dynamic models that explicitly
address ramping rate constraints, based on observed power market data.
We have noted that the existence of a centralized optimal outcome is established
in Cho and Meyn (2009) for the model with Brownian demand (2). The analysis allows
multiple generators with heterogeneous ramping constraints. The optimal solution is
characterized by computable thresholds, much like classical solutions to centralized
optimal control in inventory models (Scarf 1963, Meyn 2007). The paper by Chen et
al. (2006) contains extensions of the main result of Cho and Meyn (2009) to a network
of generators and consumers connected by constrained power lines. Even in the case
of Brownian demand, a closed form expression for the social planner’s problem is not
possible when there are constraints on links. However, it is possible to obtain struc-
tural properties of the optimal solution. These results can be applied to understand the
competitive benchmark in future market analysis.
Appendix:P roof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 states that the optimal reserve process is a reﬂective Brownian motion
(RBM) on (−∞ r∗]. To characterize the optimal policy, we ﬁrst focus on a class of poli-
cies under which the reserve process is characterized by an RBM on (−∞  ¯ r] for some
¯ r ∈ R. Such a policy is called a barrier policy,w i t hb a r r i e r¯ r.T op r o v eProposition 1,w e
ﬁrst characterize the optimal barrier r∗ within the class of barrier policies, and we then
demonstrate that this policy is optimal among all feasible policies.
A.1 Preliminaries
The welfare function can be expressed as
W(t) = (v −c)D(t)+(v +cbo)min(0 R(t))−cR(t) Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Efﬁciency and marginal cost pricing 231
On deﬁning the social cost of R(t) as
C(R(t))= cR(t)−(v +cbo)min(0 R(t)) =
 
cR(t) if R(t) > 0
−(v +cbo −c)R(t) if R(t) ≤ 0,
we express the maximization of expected welfare as the minimization of the expected
cost using the identity
−E[W(t)]=− E[(v −c)D(t)]+E[C(R(t))]=E[C(R(t))] 
The control variable of the social planner is the sample path of G(t),s u b j e c tt o( 3).
For a given ¯ r>0, the barrier policy is deﬁned as a policy under which the reserve
process becomes an RBM on (−∞ r] for any initial condition R(0). We shall give an
explicit representation for a barrier policy, but ﬁrst we recall a few key properties of an
RBM.
It is convenient to introduce the transformation
Y(t)= ¯ r −R(t)
so that Y is an RBM on [0 ∞) under the barrier policy. The evolution of Y on R+ can be
expressed as
Y(t)= y −ζt+I(t)+D(t)  t ≥ 0  (18)
where y = Y(0) = ¯ r −R(0) is the initial condition. The process I is known as the idleness
(orreﬂection)process. Theidlenessprocessisnondecreasing,withI(0) = 0,andsatisﬁes
  ∞
0
Y(t)dI(t)= 0  (19)
This makes precise the notion that I(t) can increase only when Y(t)= 0 (equivalently,
when R(t) = ¯ r).
By an exponential distribution with parameter θ∗ > 0, we mean the probability dis-
tribution supported on R+,w i t hd e n s i t yg i v e nb y
pY(y) = θ∗e−θ∗y y ≥ 0 
It is known that the RBM has a stationary distribution of this form.
Proposition 3. The reﬂected Brownian motion (18) has a unique stationary distribu-




For the proof, see Harrison and Williams (1987).
These expressions can be mapped to the reserve process, providing an explicit con-
struction of a barrier policy. Deﬁne I(t)as the gap between the maximum rate of pro-
duction and the actual generation:
I(t)= r +ζt−G(t)  (20)232 Cho and Meyn Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
This deﬁnition of I is consistent with (18). Since r +ζt is exogenous, we can treat I(t)as
a control instead of G(t). Since R(t) = G(t)−D(t),w ec a nw r i t e
R(t) = r +ζt−I(t)−D(t)  t ≥ 0 
where r = R(0).




max(0 −(¯ r −r)+ζτ−D(τ))  t ≥ 0  (21)
It is clear from this representation that I is nondecreasing and nonnegative. Moreover,
under the assumption that r ≤ ¯ r, it follows that I(0) = 0.
To verify that (21) is indeed a barrier policy, we recall the standard representation
of an RBM via the Skorokhod map (cf. Chapter 3 of Meyn 2007). Assume that a barrier
policy has been applied, so that Y(t)= ¯ r − R(t) is an RBM on [0 ∞).T h efree process
describes how Y(t)would have evolved without reﬂection, that is,
F(t):= (¯ r −r)−ζt+D(t)  t ≥ 0 
Note that F is a Brownian motion with drift −ζ. The Skorokhod map representation of
the RBM Y is given by
Y(t)= max
0≤τ≤t
max(F(t) F(t)−F(τ))  t ≥ 0  (22)




max(0 −F(τ))  t ≥ 0 
which is exactly (21). This proves that (21) describes the barrier policy with barrier ¯ r.
Proposition 3 implies that the stationary distribution of R(t) under a barrier policy
is the shifted exponential
pR(r) =
 
θ∗e−θ∗(¯ r−r) if r ≤ ¯ r
0 if r>¯ r.
(23)
A.2 Without discounting
It is instructive to apply Proposition 3 to characterize the optimal policy for the case
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(v +cbo −c)|x|θ∗eθ∗(x−¯ r)dx+
  ¯ r
0
cxθ∗eθ∗(x−¯ r)dx 
where the ﬁrst equality holds for any T by stationarity, and the second follows from the
Law of Large Numbers combined with (23).




C(−(¯ r −y))pY(y)dy 
we see that C0(¯ r) is convex and differentiable as a function of ¯ r. We obtain a formula










Section 7 of Wein (1992) proves that the barrier policy using ¯ r∗ is, in fact, an optimal
policy among all feasible policies. The proof can be obtained by appealing to the con-
vexity of the relative value function that arises in the associated average-cost dynamic
programming equations. In the next section, the value function is constructed under
the discounted cost criterion, and we ﬁnd that it is convex as a function of the initial
condition of R.
A.3 With discounting
Let us denote the discount factor as e−γ. We initially restrict analysis to barrier policies,
as represented in (21). On establishing convexity of the value function, we can conclude
as in Section 7 of Wein (1992) that the optimal barrier policy is, in fact, optimal over all
policies.
A critical bridge between this problem and the average-cost problem is the inter-
pretation of the discount term e−γt as an unnormalized exponential density. We let T
denote an exponential random variable with parameter γ, independent of the demand
process. For a given barrier policy with barrier ¯ r and a given initial condition r = R(0),
the resulting discounted cost can be expressed as
Cγ(r; ¯ r)= E









C(R(T))| R(0) = r
 
  (25)
Note that the only substantive difference between (25)a n d( 24)i st h a tT in (25)i s
a specially constructed random time, while in (25)t h et i m eT is deterministic and the
process R is assumed to be stationary. To compute the optimal policy under discount-
ing, we need only to know the distribution of R(T) when T is an exponentially distrib-
uted random variable with parameter γ>0. We ﬁnd that its form is similar to (23)w h e n
R(0) = ¯ r.234 Cho and Meyn Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
Proposition 4. Suppose that a barrier policy is applied and that R is initialized with
R(0) = ¯ r. Suppose that T is an exponential random variable with parameter γ, indepen-
dent of D. Then the random variable Y(T)= ¯ r − R(T) has an exponential distribution
whose parameter θ+ is the positive root of the quadratic equation
1
2σ2θ2 −δθ−γ = 0  (26)
Note that as γ ↓ 0,w eh a v eθ+ → θ∗, which is the parameter for the exponential
distribution that deﬁnes the steady-state distribution of Y(t).
ProofofProposition4. Toprovetheproposition,itsufﬁcestocomputethemoment
generating function of Y(T)and to show that for ϑ ≤ 0 it coincides with the moment
generating function of an exponential random variable with parameter θ+:





The differential generator for Y is deﬁned by
Dh =− ζh  + 1
2σ2h   
Lemma 4 provides a dynamic programming equation for the scaled moment generating
function for an arbitrary initial condition, that is,
h(y) = γ−1E
 
cϑ(Y(T)) | Y(0) = y
 
  (27)
where T is distributed according to the exponential distribution with parameter γ.T h e
derivative condition h (0) = 0 in Lemma 4 is a special case of the boundary condition
imposed in Theorem 2 of Harrison and Reiman (1981), and equation (30) of Harrison
and Reiman (1981) is similar to the conclusion of the lemma.
Lemma 4. Let cϑ(y) = eϑy. Supposethat h:R+ → R isa twicecontinuouslydifferentiable
function for which h and h  are bounded, and also satisfying
Dh = γh−cϑ (28)
h (0) = 0  (29)
Then h coincides with (27). Equivalently,
h(y) = E





  Y(0) = y
 
 
Proof.D e ﬁ n e
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An application of Itô’s formula gives














e−γt dt +e−γth (Y(t))dI(t)+e−γth (Y(t))dD(t) 
By the dynamic programming equation (28), we have
−γh(Y(t))+Dh(Y(t)) =− cϑ(Y(t)) 
The property (29) combined with (19)i m p l i e s
h (Y(t))dI(t) = 0 
Thus, we have
dG(t)=− e−γtcϑ(Y(t))+e−γth (Y(t))dD(t) 
which is equivalent to the integral equation







Since h and h  are bounded, we can take expectations of each side and let t →∞to
obtain the desired formula:
h(y) = E





  Y(0) = y
 
  
Next we construct a solution to (28)a n d( 29). Since −2γ/σ2 < 0, the quadratic equa-
tion (26) has two real roots: the parameter θ+ > 0 deﬁned in Proposition 4 and a second





σ2 = (ϑ−θ−)(ϑ−θ+)  (30)
Moreover, a small amount of algebra shows that
θ+θ− =−
2γ
σ2 < 0  (31)




















= γh(y)−eϑy y ≥ 0 236 Cho and Meyn Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
















eθ−y = 0 
Since θ− is a solution of (26), we have
γ +ζθ− − 1
2σ2θ2
− = 0 





2σ2ϑ2 −1  (32)
The ﬁnal step is to evaluate γh(0) to show that it coincides with the moment gener-





We obtain the desired formula by substituting the expression for κ in (32) into the deﬁ-


































The next step in the proof of Proposition 1 is the derivation of the formula (8). This
follows exactly the same steps as in the case without discounting, after we replace θ∗
by θ+.
These arguments demonstrate only that (8) induces a barrier policy that is optimal
among all barrier policies, subject to the constraint that the reserve process is initial-
ized with R(0) = ¯ r∗. The ﬁnal step in the proof of Proposition 1 is to remove these re-
strictions: We must generalize to arbitrary initial conditions and demonstrate that the
optimal policy is indeed a barrier policy. For this, we apply dynamic programming ar-
guments. Combining (20) and the ramping constraint (3), we regard
I ={ I | I is adapted to G, and nondecreasing, with I(0) = 0}
as the set of all feasible controls. Let H∗:R → R denote the discounted value function,




   ∞
0
e−γtC(R(t))dt
   
  R(0) = r
 
 r ∈ R 
Following the proof of Proposition 9.8.1 in Meyn (2007), we can show that H∗(r) is a
convex nonincreasing function of r.I nf a c t ,H∗(r) can be computed explicitly: Follow-
ing the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 3.4.13 in Meyn (2007), we obtain theTheoretical Economics 5 (2010) Efﬁciency and marginal cost pricing 237
following representation. The value function is constant on [¯ r∗ ∞) and, for r ≤ ¯ r∗,
H∗(r) = γ−1C(r)+γ−2C (r)+
 
a−e−θ−r if r<0
b−e−θ−r +b+e−θ+r if 0 ≤ r ≤ ¯ r∗,




−(v +cbo −c) if r<0
c if r ≥ 0.
The three constants (a− b− b+) are speciﬁed by the three constraints









H∗(¯ r∗) = 0 
This function solves the dynamic programming equation for this optimal control prob-
lem, as described in Atar and Budhiraja (2006):
DH∗(r) =− c(r)+γH∗(r)  r < ¯ r∗ 
d
dr
H∗(¯ r∗) = 0 
It follows from Theorem 2.1 of Atar and Budhiraja (2006) that the associated barrier pol-
icy is optimal over all policies for any initial condition.
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